

Intellectuals and the Land – A Workshop at Mutianyu Great Wall

Saturday 19 June, 2010

Panel Discussion

Chair: David Kelly

Panelists: Hao Zhidong, “The Role of Intellectuals in Rural Development in China”

Liu Laoshi, “农村发展与青年知识分子乡土回归”

Zhu Xiaoyang, “Beware the Dinosaurisation of Cities!”

Timothy Cheek, “Reflections on Intellectuals and the Land in China”

Commentator: Paul Mooney

Panelist Bios:

Hao Zhidong

This is Zhidong from the University of Macau. My general research interests are in the sociology of intellectuals and political sociology. The specific areas of my study include nationalism across the Taiwan Strait, rural development, and Macau history and society. Recently I've been working on a number of projects, including the book on Intellectuals and Rural Development, the last of my trilogy on intellectuals, the other two being Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of China's Knowledge Workers (2003), and Whither Taiwan and Mainland China: National Identity, the State, and Intellectuals (2010). I'm enclosing the long table of contents (mostly in Chinese) for my book on intellectuals and rural development for your critique.

Liu Laoshi

I'm Liulaoshi from the Beijing Liangshuming Rural Reconstruction Center. I think of my own position as an operator and a promoter of social practice, not as a theorist. The remarks I will present are about our work of integrating college student volunteers as they participate in rural community development. After the workshop, it is my pleasure to invite you to visit our commune and exchange ideas.

Zhu Xiaoyang

An Associate Professor in the Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, Beijing University, Dr Zhu is a leading exponent of legal anthropology in China. He has carried out many consultancy projects for the Ford Foundation and other organisations. An expert in the fieldwork methodologies of projects of this kind, he became Research Director for the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation on the establishment of this NGO in 2002. In the connection he has published on "Turning points in poverty and anti-poverty intervention." He has another paper on "The principle of charity."

Timothy Cheek

Historian Timothy Cheek is Professor and Louis Cha Chair in Chinese Research at the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, and a distinguished scholar of modern China. He is currently a Schoolhouse Fellow for June 2010, where his is enjoying residency in Mutianyu.

The Role of Intellectuals in Rural Development in China

Zhidong Hao
University of Macau

Main Points to Make: 1) The historical background of the role of intellectuals in the countryside; 2) A analytical framework in understanding the role of intellectuals: organic, professional, and critical; 3) The role of organic intellectuals in rural development; 4) The role of professional intellectuals in rural development; 5) The role of critical intellectuals in rural development; 6) An evaluation of the role of intellectuals in general.

The Historical Role of Intellectuals

In traditional Chinese society in general, the landed gentry served as the bridge between the government and the people in villages.

As in the case of my village, they were from families of successful businessmen, landlords, and scholar-officials.

They would mediate legal disputes between peasants; supervise local schools, academies, and irrigation works; build temples; recruit and train local militia; and help collect taxes

If the role of intellectuals in the traditional society was played mainly by the rural gentry, the role of intellectuals in the modern society was dominated by intellectuals from outside the village.

The best example of city intellectuals involving themselves in the development in the countryside may be James Yen (Yan Yangchu), Liang Shuming, and others in the rural transformation movement in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.

The government of Yan Xishan in Shanxi province also started what is known as *cun ben zhengzhi* movement in 1917.

In 1928, the 17th year of the Republican era, students from Pingding High School came to my village and organized an anti-feudal movement in the village. They destroyed the deities in the various temples in the Temple of Hanxin, Erlang Miao, Bala Miao, Shifo Niangniang Miao, Dawang Miao, Longwang Miao, Cang Yan Ci, the three passage ways, etc. They also advocated the abolishment of foot-binding, gambling, opium smoking, and sexual discrimination.

This “anti-feudal” movement was followed by the revolutionary movement organized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the war of resistance against the Japanese. The district (just under the county level) Party committee developed the first CCP member in the village in 1944. One year later, the Party took in nine more young people from the village. These Party members in turn organized various associations related to the war: young people’s guard of resistance against

the Japanese, the military committee of resistance against the Japanese, peasants' association, workers' association, women's anti-Japanese association, a village militia, and a children's corps to assist the militia, etc. The traditional role of intellectuals in the countryside is now ended.

An Analytical Framework of the Role of Intellectuals

Broadly defined, intellectuals are those people who have received a considerable amount of education and are doing some kind of professional work.

First, in the modern or contemporary societies, there have been intellectuals who have become officials or work for officials, just like the scholar-officials of the past, whom we will now call *organic intellectuals*.

The organic intellectuals in this study will be those who are in leadership positions, make the government and local policies in rural China, and implement them. They also include those in various other government agencies and think-tanks, such as government controlled radio and TV stations, newspapers and magazines as well as academies of social sciences at various levels. In a word, they design, advocate, and implement the government policies.

Second, typical *professionals* are those intellectuals who pursue their intellectual work for the sake of intellectual work, or "art for art's sake." They do not generally involve themselves in politics.

The professionals in our study will be those who do research on the countryside or organize professional help to the rural community. They may reside in academies of sciences or social sciences or universities. But they do not get directly involved in government policymaking or social movements to advance peasants' interests as organic intellectuals would do. They are not as critical to the state as critical intellectuals are, either. They try to maintain an "objective" stand in their work.

Third, *critical intellectuals* are the farthest from the powers that be; in fact, they are critical of them. In addition to being critical of the powers, such intellectuals are professional in their work, concerned about the most disadvantaged in society, and following an ethic of ultimate ends. They serve as the conscience of society

The critical intellectuals in this study will be those who take a critical stance toward the vast inequalities between the city and the countryside and the inefficiency of the government policies on these issues. But generally they do not get directly involved in social movements to advance peasants' interests with more radical means and seldom organize dissident activities against government's rural policies; otherwise, they would become organic intellectuals to peasants.

Typically, critical and professional on one hand and organic intellectuals on the other have different ethics. Critical and professional intellectuals follow an ethic of ultimate ends and will stand for a set of ultimate and absolute values and will not use dubious means to achieve their goals. But organic intellectuals, on the other hand, will follow an ethic of responsibility and use

“morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones” to achieve what they believe to be ethically good purposes

Organic Intellectuals and Their Roles

First of all, there are hundreds of researchers who are doing policy reports and analysis. From 1979 to April 2006, the central government, either in the name of the Party Central Committee, the State Council, or various ministries, released 613 documents with increasing frequencies from year to year. How did they come up with these documents? And who wrote them?

There is a huge number of government agencies at the central, provincial, the city, and county levels as well as institutes of research, and colleges and universities that are related to agriculture in one way or another with countless cadres, researchers, professors, and students, both graduate and undergraduate. Since majority of the Chinese live and work in the countryside, we can safely assume that the majority of other government branches and organizations also often involve themselves with rural development, for example, the Party committees and government officials at various levels, as well as the People’s Congresses (down to the *xiang* level) and People’s Political Consultative Congresses.

It is true that most of the intellectuals in these organizations are not involved in policy making, especially at the central level. But some apparently do. Typically, for example, experts in a certain field, especially from a research branch of the relevant government agency, are responsible for, among other things, the draft of a formal government document, or part of the government document that has to do with rural development, such as the annual report by the premier to the National People’s Congress. These experts will consult with government officials at central and provincial levels on one hand and scholars on the issue on the other.

The Research Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) attached to the Ministry of Agriculture “is to provide information and recommendations for the Central Government on its decision making in the areas of rural and agricultural policies, rural development strategies and institutional reforms.” The same is true with the Institute of Rural Development at CASS.

Second of all, when policies are made, it is the responsibility of the provincial, city, county and *xiang* level government cadres to implement them. There is a large number of government organizations, and by implication, a large number of cadres and researchers in a specific province, city, and county that are engaged in rural development. To these, we should add the Party and government cadres doing administrative work at various levels.

That they are organic intellectuals doesn’t mean that they are not critical at all. Du Rongshen was known to have argued with the authorities, including Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang, about rural policies. The township heads I interviewed were also critical of the county government for their not taking a more active role in helping the villages develop agricultural products that would work in their particular areas.

A more typical case of organic intellectuals being also critical may be intellectuals in the mass media. Chen Guidi and Chun Tao describe how the reporters from Xinhua News Agency in Anhui province, the CCTV, *Nanfang Zhoumo*, etc. revealed the murder of villager representatives by a village head and his son. They were murdered because they wanted the village heads to make public the village account books, something required by village governance rules.

But, of course, organic intellectuals' criticism and resistance against the powers they serve are limited.

The Role of Professional Intellectuals

Most people in research institutions and universities are professionals.

Zhang Xiaoshan, the director of the Institute of Rural Development at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IRD of CASS) claims that their mission is to provide quality policy suggestions for the Party and the state, i.e., to play an organic role, but he also says that he would like his researchers to do professional work while writing research papers, in terms of literature review, citations, data collection and data processing, all conforming to international standards.

The same can also be said about the major journals on rural development, including *Zhongguo Nongcun Yanjiu* (China rural studies), edited by Xu Yong of the Research Center on China's Rural Problems at Huazhong Teachers University, and *San Nong Zhongguo* (China's peasants, agriculture, and countryside), edited by He Xuefeng of Research Center on China's Rural Reform at Huazhong University of Science and Technology. *Zhongguo Xiangcun Yanjiu* (Journal of studies on China's rural areas), edited by Philip Huang of UCLA, is more on the research or professional side.

The second kind of professional intellectuals, in addition to the researchers we mentioned above, are what we may call NGO activists. Again they may or may not be in the system, but they do mostly professional work. They may cooperate with the system in their own ways, but they are mostly not organic intellectuals to it. And they are not critical intellectuals to the peasant farmers since they do not enter conflict directly with the powers that be, just as the other group of professionals discussed above. They use their professional skills to help with rural development.

There are many such examples, including engineers and technicians in various government agencies, and people from the Liang Shuming Institute of Rural Reconstruction.

These intellectuals follow an ethic of ultimate ends, i.e., an ethic of professionalism, or "research for research's sake," or "help for help's sake." So effectiveness in overall social change may not be their main concern. Just as critical intellectuals, they can also criticize the powers that be, but they are not as often critical as the critical intellectuals.

They are not organic to peasant movements. And they are not organic to the state as typical organic intellectuals are, either.

The Role of Critical Intellectuals

One of the most interesting phenomena concerning rural development is the activities by a few lawyers who involve themselves in lawsuits against corrupt entrepreneurs in the city concerning migrant workers there.

The other group of critical intellectuals is composed of researchers and activists. Li Changping, for example, revealed corrupt practices in a *xiang* in Hubei where he was a *xiang* Party Committee head, and called on the state to do more to protect the peasants' interests.

Chen Guidi and Chun Tao wrote *Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha* (a report on China's peasants), focusing on corruption in Anhui province.

This book and that of Li Changping's are two landmark works that have played an instrumental role in arousing many people's concerns in the problems in the countryside in the past several years.

There are several characteristics of these critical intellectuals.

First they choose to study and work on the inequalities between the city and the countryside and the corruption of cadres and entrepreneurs.

Second, they have a clear moralistic tone in their writing and in their work. They serve as the conscience of society, following the ethic of ultimate ends, and want to keep reminding the state and other powers that be that they are shortchanging the peasants. They have a clear sense of right and wrong.

Third, they are often very professional in their collection of data, although they do not often follow the formats of professional work.

Fourth, they are critical of the state but not organic to the peasants, since they do not go as far as organizing peasant movements in direct conflict with the state or the Party.

Fifth, their criticism of the state has to be restrained to some extent.

An Overall Evaluation of the Role of Intellectuals

First, the different roles of intellectuals we discuss in this paper, that is, organic, professional, and critical, are ideal types. This means that although we are able to isolate the characteristics of these different roles, we are unable to say that one intellectual is all the time organic, professional, or critical. Du Runsheng, for example, played all the three roles. The same may be true of other

intellectuals, including Wen Tiejun, Yu Jianrong, Li Changping, Xu Yong, He Xuefeng, to name just a few. We can, however, say that at a certain time and on certain issues they play one role rather than the other.

Second, different intellectuals follow different ethics. Organic intellectuals follow the ethic of responsibility in the sense that they will have to sacrifice some of their integrity while serving the powers that be. It is difficult for He Huili or Wu Huailian to be overly critical of the Party and the government, since they are part of it.

Professional and critical intellectuals follow the ethic of the ultimate ends. Typically the former is interested only in understanding what has happened and is happening in the countryside, rather than what ought to be happening, as the latter does.

Third, while organic and professional intellectuals are spread out at all levels of government, research institutions, and colleges and universities, critical intellectuals are mostly big city dwellers. There are not many professional intellectuals in the countryside, either. But without systematic state efforts involving many more intellectuals and in a much wider area of the country, their role will continue to be limited.

Fourth, the elitism among different kinds of intellectuals is intriguing as well. Elitism generally refers to intellectuals viewing themselves as better than those who have less knowledge or talk less well. Elitism of intellectuals is reflected in several ways.

For one thing, they may look down on peasants. The *xiang-zhen* heads I interviewed did not think that the peasants' qualities (农民素质) are good enough for them to be able to conduct the elections at the *xiang-zhen* level.

Xu Yong says that scholars studying the rural society are not supposed to find a way for peasants, to sympathize with them, or criticize them. We only analyze what is happening. Otherwise, he says, we become "small peasants" (*xiao nong* 小农). He says that we who study *xiao nong* should not become *xiao nong* ourselves. It is easy for us to become small peasants, the narrow minded (狭隘的), emotional (情感的), and moralistic (道义的) small peasants. We must surpass small peasants. The phrase *xiao nong* has many negative connotations.

The second kind of intellectuals' elitism is demonstrated in the Chinese professional researchers' looking down upon foreign professional researchers, or researchers who vigorously incorporate foreign scholarship on China's rural development. The latter practice is called by these critics as *xueshu zhimin* 学术殖民, or colonial scholarship. It means the use of westerners' eyes to look at the Chinese experience, implying that it is impractical and biased. Therefore China's scholarship on rural development should be de-westernized or *qu xifang hua* 去西方化.

I will now focus on a third kind of elitism where one type of intellectuals view themselves as better than the other kind. Generally speaking, and in some instances, professionals might view organic intellectuals, especially those in leadership positions, as lacking depth and width of

knowledge for decision making. Organic intellectuals view the professionals as lacking real and practical knowledge in governance. And critical intellectuals may view the other two as lacking moral concerns. All of them may be right, but only to some extent.

It is interesting, though, to see professional intellectuals view critical intellectuals as non-professional and lacking persuasion. In the above mentioned discussion on Chen Guidi's and Chun Tao's book on China's peasants, Xu Yong, Yuan Fangcheng, and Meng Wei thought that responsible intellectuals should only study what is happening and what may happen, not what should happen. To have a moral tendency (*daoyi qingxiang*) is wrong, according to Xu Yong. The Chinese society, scholars, and scholarship should be rational and reasonable (*lixing hua*), Xu Yong says.

Yuan Fangcheng implies that to reform is to sacrifice some people's interests. Here he refers to peasants' interests, since the book is talking about the sacrifice peasants are bearing. He thinks that this sacrifice is a necessary means for social development. He thinks that starting with what is good for society will take scholarship in a wrong way. Liu Yiqiang thinks that Chen Guidi's and Chun Tao's book is bad because it takes our attention away from the peasants' own problems to the problems of the officials, although he thinks that those who oppress peasants should also be taken care of.

Conclusion

Only when the three kinds of intellectuals merge in their discourses and practices can the so-call *san nong* (peasants, agriculture, and countryside) problem have a realistic solution, if there is a solution. To what extent they can merge and when they can merge needs further investigation.

Li Changping is even asking whether intellectuals' involvement in the countryside is a good thing, since they do not necessarily know what is needed there. That may very well be true, but the involvement of intellectuals is inevitable. The only thing that intellectuals do need to do but haven't done much yet, though, is to evaluate their involvement, as this paper does.

农村发展与青年知识分子乡土回归

Liu Laoshi

按照钱理群老师的划分，目前中国正处在第六代大规模的知识分子下乡运动中。

前五代下乡运动分别是：

第一代是指五四时期的知识分子。这个阶段的知识分子下乡受到当时俄国民粹主义思想的影响，他们提倡新村运动来推进中国的民主政治改革，视农村改革为国家发展的关键。第二代是 30 年代。30 年代存在着分别以毛泽东和晏阳初梁漱溟为代表的两条道路。第三代是四十年代抗战时期。实践着知识分子与广大农民最紧密的结合。第四代是五六十年代。当时的知识分子满怀着建设祖国和自我改造的两大热情，经历了大饥荒和文化大革命两大历史事件。第五代是知青。

第六代从 2000 年大学生支农调研开始，已历十年，方兴未艾。目前眼前的这种运动还只能算作前期，前期主体活动是青年大学生志愿者参与和推动的新乡村建设运动。

这个从新世纪初开始的叫做**青年大学生志愿者参与和推动的新乡村建设运动**的 v 青年知识分子下乡运动的主要内容可以阐述如下：

它产生的背景是：

第一，在中国迅速现代化的大背景下，一边是城市飞速发展，但是另一面，资本侵蚀农村，乡村日益衰败。

第二，与这种衰败相伴随的现象是农民基本权利受损，为了捍卫自己的权利，农民激烈抗争。

第三，虽然这种现代化乃至去农村化趋势是政权推动的结果，但是国家政权仍然存有善意，不希望农村急速衰败和动荡不安。所以从开始就发出政策调整信号，对农村问题表现出改善的强烈关注。

第四，从九十年代以后，知识分子的整体社会关怀走入低谷，也失去了以往的道德光环。尤其是年轻的知识分子，其中以大学生为主，逐渐的功利和失去责任，已经不能引领时代。甚至成为这个时代的对立物。这与八十年代形成鲜明对比。

第五，青年知识分子（尤其是大学生毕业群体）在城市里没有出路，自身的生存遇到问题。没有出路，没有希望。

正是在这个背景下，从 2000 年开始，大学生开始走入农村，这种工作首先是从农村维权调查开始的。

这个运动也是逐渐的走出来的。一开始很简单，后来才逐渐形成规模。这个运动有很多表现形式，也有众多类型的参与者。有的来自民间，有的来自官方，有的结构完整，有的表现松散，偶尔为之。其中有官方的新的“三支一扶”，官方的大学生村官计划；但是主导力量来源于民间。其中以大学生志愿者参与的新乡村建设运动，规模最大，影响最为深远，这是这个时代的下乡运动的主体。

这个主体运动以大学生支农社团下乡为主，如今参与学校约二百多个，二百家社团；十万志愿者，影响波及面达到百万学生，骨干分子达千人。国内主要的城市的大学都有类似的青年运动。

这个运动具有如下鲜明的特点：

首先，它是从农村社区外部进行的大范围的下乡支持运动。主要参与力量并非来自于社区内部，而是来源于社区外部。其次，这个运动具有鲜明的价值诉求，是具有很强道德色彩的奉献运动，是志愿者下乡。再次，它是以志愿者短期的间歇性参与为主，一般时间都是一周左右，很少有在一个月以上的。第四，这个运动一开始就受到来自官方的很大的压力，但这种压力却又并不具有摧毁性。第五，这种运动是非体制安排的民间运动，与 NGO 兴起结合在一起。第六，具有很强烈的社会倡导性，一方面它立足于农村现实状态的改变，另一方面又有非常强烈的社会倡导的色彩。

这个运动可以分为如下三个阶段：

第一阶段 农村维权调查阶段（2000~2003）。这个阶段从一开始的偶尔为之的大学生农村调查开始，逐渐向多个城市扩展，最后逐渐形成成为全国性的一个农村调查热潮。这个工作的推动力量是中国改革农村版。

第二阶段 参与和推动乡村发展阶段（2003~2007）。以 2003 年安徽阜阳南塘村为标志，这个运动开始从原来的对抗为主的调查逐步转向以建设为主的新乡村建设运动。推动力量是乡村建设中心。

第三阶段 长期化和多样化深度发展阶段（2007~）。从 2008 年开始逐步转向多样化发展阶段。这个阶段的主要表现是：

第一，开始现象出长期化、职业化的特点，而不再局限于原来的短期下乡和志愿者行为。其中以大学生农村创业和大学生们的回乡运动为主要特征。

第二，开始由农民关注转向关注农民工以及整体社会发展。从早期支农开始的社团和参与者逐步展现出很强烈的社会关注，这是社会关注后期表现在农民工关注和整体社会反思的过程中。

第三，这个运动开始转向大学生以及青年知识分子对自身生存状况的关注。如蜗居、蚁族到公社，以及新幸福主义婚礼的探索。这意味着青年知识分子开始用另一种方式寻求自己存在的方式和发展道路。

如何来评价这个运动呢？

有如下几点：

第一，这个运动最终推动了青年人以及全社会对农村问题的广泛关注，在此背景下，农村关怀已经成为一种道义运动。

第二，带动了青年知识分子的社会参与的复归，是二十年来青年责任和青年参与的另一形式回归。八十年代末以后知识分子的社会参与中断，但是青年人是一定要展现自己对社会的关注的，支农调研就是这种回归的另一种表现。

第三，带动了关于整个国家发展道路和社会发展的反思，本质上是一种新的文化运动。以这个运动为开端，逐渐展开了一场新的文化的运动，这个运动是一种社会运动的开始。

第四，也由此带动了关于知识和方法的转变，反动单纯的理论和书本，走向实践。

Beware the dinosaurisation of cities!*

The document now facing me, from the Kunming City Planning Commission Office (no. 1 for 2010) is worth a read. To use a modish phrase, it's "damn exciting!" It states that in project planning for residential apartments up to 40 stories in downtown Kunming, "approval in principle is no longer required except for urban landscape considerations, requirements for aircraft clearance and controls on land construction sites In accordance with this, detailed plans for 'urban village' reconstructions will undertake a comprehensive sorting-out (*shuli*)."

Let's go riding on the wings of imagination, skimming over the landscape of modern greater Kunming. Here are 330 places classified as "urban villages" covering 18 square km in the main city construction zone... Imagine further that all this remodelling into urban villages will be done as "strip integration," which will draw in neighbouring localities lying outside the demolition and remodelling plan. As things stand, the scope of urban village remodelling is being expanded to an even greater scale. A recent example is the urban village renovation of Panjiawan in Kunming. Although this urban village is only 39 acres, the area to be demolished is 129 acres. Imagine this picture of the future city: high-rise towers; all residences over 40 stories; the concrete forests and steel cities will of course be interspersed with green space and plazas.....This is the legendary "Oriental Geneva," a "bridgehead to Southeast Asia" and a "bright—pastoral—sanitary city."

Such a picture of the future in China's urbanisation movement is no isolated case. I call this sort of city renovation and urbanisation "urban dinosaurisation." Dinosaurisation refers to their expansion to form enormous bodies; and the unsustainability of this urban development; self-evidently, it also refers to their dinosaur-style fate. It can be predicted first of all that the cost of the dinosaur-style outcome will not be borne by those who created the dinosaurs—city leaders, planners and real estate developers. These people will leave early, and the price will be paid by those living in those areas.

It's not going too far calling such cities dinosaurs. While satisfying a modernist desire to gaze on the human realm from some cosmic vantage point, such high-rise communities are hollow, and will extinguish the city's intrinsic vitality. In the old cities in today's China, vitality is generated by three types of residential areas:

First, traditional neighborhoods, like the *hutongs* [alleyways] in Beijing's eastern and western areas and the Xuanwu and Chongwen districts. These have centuries of history; their neighborhoods, where a mixture of residents live in view of each other, gave the city much of its life.

The second type of area are work unit communities formed in the 1950s. While the architecture in these areas is unremarkable, they have, like the older city neighborhoods, social capital and vitality.

* Zhu Xiaoyang, "Jingti chengshi konglonghua" [Beware the dinosaurisation of cities!], *Nanfang Zhoumo* [Southern Weekend], 31 March 2010 [朱晓阳: "警惕城市恐龙化!", *南方周末*, 2010年3月31日 (<http://www.infzm.com/content/43327>)].

Third are urban villages. These areas are urban communities formed in a village framework. The urban village is completely stigmatised in the current urban remodeling movement, but as those who have lived in these places and serious researchers know, it is the same as the first two urban communities, in terms of being a place that is functionally intact and orderly (though not in the eyes of city leaders), where residents are in close contact in a livable environment.

It is these places, which extend the life of the city and disseminate the vitality that the modernist dinosaur city wants to extinguish and replace. Can communities in the dinosaur city promote urban vitality? When a host of such communities emerged in the 1990's, people designed ideal social spaces for these places, with democratic homeowner's committees and market-oriented property management. But still the most fundamental problem of these communities is the impossibility of organising the community and the difficulty of forming committees of homeowner's, leaving them to skirmish with, rather than resist, the property companies. These areas superficially look bright, but apart from a minority of residents composed of people from a work-unit who bought their housing collectively, they don't properly solve resident/management problems. A great deal of social science investigation has confirmed this view. Such modernised communities need several decades of people "living with" the other people and things found there, before enough vitality gathers to change it from being a giant with an empty shell.

The dinosaurisation of cities is demonstrated further in their external expansion and engulfing of land and other resources to sustain it. Let me stay with Kunming as a case I know well. The area of the entire Dianchi watershed is 2,920 square km. Counting the plain and basin alone, the area is only 590 square km. According to official plans, the central city area Kunming should have been confined to 164.25 square km by 2010. The main urban region of Kunming already reached 249 square kilometers two years before. The consequences of such "urban dinosaurisation" have already been enunciated by experts on resources and ecosystems. Following this year's devastating drought in the Kunming region, some experts pointed out that one of its causes was the rapid advance of urbanisation in the Dianchi Lake Basin, which has brought the capacity of its supporting water resources to the limit.

Another example is the insertion of the north-south Kunluo Road that extinguished the "muckrakers" along the east coast of Dianchi Lake. The route planned for the road destroyed the irrigation system built in the 1950's, so that a place that in former times maintained high yields has been turned into one of alternating droughts and floods. Such roads also intensify urban expansion: once there is a road, property development frenzy follows. Kunming in the pre-drought years was already one of the nation's 14 most water-stressed cities. This may seem ridiculous, but it's true.

My warnings about urban dinosaurisation were based on the notion that the dinosaur manufacturers entertained a naïve modernist aesthetic. But I see that, in fact, all the 40-plus storey buildings imagined by these people are nothing but heaps of "silver" reaching to the sky—from the huge land transfer fees arising from urban village demolitions to the astronomical prices of the mansions—and of so-called political merit. Such are the dreams of the dinosaur makers.

How to put an end to urban dinosaurisation with one or two realistic proposals? Let us put an end to the utopia eulogized as the "bright—pastoral—sanitary city". It is within the enchantment of this "utopia" that the violence of money-driven major demolition and construction finds legitimacy, while the world of daily life of countless people meets destruction. Let us hold fast to

each “decrepit” neighborhood and compound, and firmly reject the hard and soft violence of the money utopia. Taking this standpoint, the spread of urban dinosaurisation will be stopped.

出现在我面前的这份昆明市规划委办的文件（2010年1号）值得一读，用时下的一句话说：太刺激了！文称：昆明的中心城区住宅项目规划，“除有城市景观、机场净空高度控制要求和建设场地限制的地块外，原则上不再受理审批40层以下的住宅”……“城中村改造项目修建性详细规划按上述要求进行全面梳理。”

让我们乘着想象的翅膀，飞掠一下这个现代大昆明的景观吧。这里是主城区建成区内被列为“城中村”的330个地方，18平方公里……再设想一下，这些城中村改造都要以“整合成片”之名实施，“整合”就是将邻近不相干的地方纳入拆迁改造之内。目前状况下这种城中村改造范围能扩大到一两倍甚至更大的范围。最近的一个例子是昆明市潘家湾城中村改造，城中村仅有39亩，而拆迁范围将有129亩。请想象一下这个未来城市的图景：高楼耸立，所有这些土地上的住宅在40层以上；水泥的森林、钢铁的城市，当然会有绿地和广场穿插其间……这就是传说中的“东方日内瓦”、“东南亚桥头堡”和“光明-田园-卫生城”。

这幅未来图景在中国的城市化运动中不是孤立一案。我将这种城市改造和城市化称为“城市恐龙化”。恐龙化意味着它们在扩张成巨大无比的身躯；意味着城市发展的不可持续性；不言而喻，这也意味着恐龙式的命运。可以预言在先，恐龙式结局的代价不会由恐龙制造者——城市领导人、规划者和房地产开发商来承担。这些人将早早撤走，代价将由生活在那个地区的人来付。

说这种城市是恐龙并不过分。高层小区虽然满足一种从宇宙间俯瞰人寰的现代主义观看快感，但却是空壳化的，它将城市本来具有的生气灭绝。在当今中国的旧城市中，生气由三种居住区产生，第一是传统的邻里，它们是如北京的东西两城和宣武崇文的胡同区。这些地区有百年以上的历史，其混合居住和邻里相互守望形成城市生命之源。第二是上个世纪50年代以后形成的单位社区。这些地方的建筑虽然平庸，但是其深厚的社会资本和生气与老城的邻里社区一样。第三是城中村。这些地带是以村庄的框架形成的城市社区。城中村在目前的城市改造运动中虽然被完全污名化，但是住过这些地方的人和认真的研究者都知道，它是如前两种城市社区一样，属于功能完好，有条有理（但不是从城市领导人的眼光看）居民交往密切和生活方便的地方。

这些使城市生命绵延和生气散发的所在却是现代主义恐龙城市欲消灭和取代的地方。恐龙城市的小区能使城市的生气得到发扬吗？上个世纪90年代这些小区大批出现以后，已经有不少人为这些地方设计理想的社会空间，例如民主的业主委员会和市场化的物业管理等。但是到目前为止这些小区最根本的问题就是无法组成一个社区，业委会难以形成，业主以散兵方式对抗物业公司。在这些外表光鲜的地方，除了少部分由单位集体买房组成居民的外，没有使居住和管理问题解决好的。这已经是目前许多社会科学调查形成的一种共识了。这种现代化小区需要过几十年，经过人与人、人与物相互“住”入，使生气凝聚起来，才能改变其空壳巨人的实质。

城市恐龙化更体现在它的外部扩张和对可承载的土地等资源的吞噬上。仍然以我熟悉的昆明为例。整个滇池流域，面积为2920平方公里。如果只算平原和盆地的话，面积仅有590平方公里。按照官方规划，到2010年昆明市的中心城区面积应该

控制在 164.25 平方公里。昆明市主城区两年前就已经达到 249 平方公里。至于这样一种可称之为“城市恐龙化”的后果是什么，已经有资源和生态环境方面的专家在发话。今年昆明地区遭遇特大旱灾后，有专家指出旱灾的成因之一是滇池流域的城市化急速推进，使滇池流域水资源的支持能力达到极限。

再如那条消灭粪瓢人的昆洛路由北向南沿着滇池东岸插下去，其所划过之处，建于上个世纪 50 年代的农田水利灌溉系统遭到破坏，使昔日的旱涝保收之地变成干旱和水涝交替的地方。而且这种公路还使城市扩张变本加厉，一有公路便有狂热的房地产开发跟进。在没有旱灾的年月昆明已经是全国最缺水的 14 个城市之一。这有点让人匪夷所思，但这是真的。

我这些对城市恐龙化的警告完全是建立在设想恐龙制造者都怀着一颗现代主义美学的天真心做出的。但现实让我看到，这些人所想象的每一座 40 层以上的楼房只是些堆上天际的“银子”——从城中村拆迁产生的巨额土地出让费到豪宅的天价——和“政绩”。这才是恐龙制造者的梦想。

如何以一两个现实的建议来终止城市恐龙化呢？让我们终止讴歌“光明-田园-卫生城”乌托邦。正是在这种“乌托邦”的光环下，金钱驱动的大拆大建获得暴力正当性，无数人的日常生活世界遭到摧毁。让我们坚守住每一个“破旧”街区和大院，坚决拒绝金钱乌托邦的硬暴力和软暴力。站住这个立场，城市恐龙化就不能蔓延。

* Zhu Xiaoyang, “Jingtǐ chéngshì kǒnglónghuà” [Beware the dinosaurisation of cities!], *Nanfang Zhoumo* [Southern Weekend], 31 March 2010 [朱晓阳：“警惕城市恐龙化！”，*南方周末*，2010 年 3 月 31 日 (<http://www.infzm.com/content/43327>)].

Reflections on Intellectuals and the Land in China

Notes for the Mutianyu Workshop on Intellectuals and Land (Educated Elites and Rural Society) in Contemporary China, June 2010

Timothy Cheek

Our topic is intellectuals and the land in China, or: What is the relationship between China's educated elites and local society, as well as rural society? We come to this topic in this workshop more as intellectuals than as specialists, or as professionals of various backgrounds addressing an important question that is bigger than our particular professional specialization.

I work on intellectual history from the perspective of the social life of thought—thinking people doing stuff and sounding off about it. I do revolution: CCP history, Mao, Party intellectuals. This includes the period of rural revolution in the 1930s and 1940s, but my focus has been on “establishment intellectuals” in the CCP and how Maoism worked in practice in the propaganda system. While my focus was elsewhere, my work has left me with some jarring images when it comes to intellectuals and the land:

Wang Shiwei (王实味): the noted intra-Party critic in Yan'an in the early 1940s. He's remembered as a brave dissident who stood up to Mao. Some Western scholars like to think he was somehow a democrat or a “sprout of democracy”, but my research convinced me that he was pretty elitist, urban oriented, and definitely communist—he just thought “artists” should be in charge of the spirit of revolution (which equaled Western-style modernization plus egalitarian social order) and not a bunch of morally compromised “politicians” (viz. Wang's famous “政治家与艺术家”). Most people talk about Wang Shiwei in terms of the CCP's abuse of power and suppression of intellectual freedom. In addition, what struck me was: despite all that, Mao was right—what Wang Shiwei wrote and what he wanted to do had no connection with

rural people; it was urban and elite and certainly didn't make sense in NW Shaanxi in 1942. Wang Shiwei was a classic May Fourth revolutionary cut off from "rural China."

Deng Tuo (邓拓): the noted intra-Party critic and author of *Evening Chats at Yanshan* and co-author of *Notes from a Three Family Village*. He is mostly remembered for trying to reform Mao after the Great Leap and getting denounced (and dying early) in the Cultural Revolution. Again, most Western scholars have seen Deng Tuo as a proto-democrat or at least representing a democratic urge. Again, I don't. He was a loyal Maoist, albeit from an institutional perspective of a bureaucrat trying to apply a massive social and technological revolution in an orderly fashion. Mao's betrayal of this loyal cadre is one of the many tragedies of the 1960s. However, Deng Tuo, unlike Wang Shiwei, was not alienated from the countryside. I suspect his decade or more in North China (1937-49, mostly in the Jin Cha Ji Base Area working with Nie Rongzhen) were his happiest days. As I studied his life in those years I was struck by how much he resembled—structurally—a Confucian gentleman in his locality. The local peasants called him "Deng lao" and village leaders sought this CCP cadre to adjudicate local disputes, just like a district magistrate or gentry of years past. He even penned classical-style poems. Of course, it was not the same thing as a Qing *shidaifu*, but it was familiar.

Wang Shiwei the *zhishifenzi* was alienated from local society; Deng Tuo the *ganbu* was connected. What's up? Why? We all know the problem of "local bullies and evil gentry" (土豪劣绅) in the 1920s, 30s and 40s—from the depopulation of educated people from the countryside. Clearly, being a cadre in a national revolutionary party was one way to re-insert educated elites into the countryside.

A few years later, this question of intellectuals and local society snuck up on me again. I was asked to make a review of intellectuals and academics in the 20th century for an encyclopedia. I reviewed the *institutions*, the *identities*, and the *social roles* that

shaped China's educated elites (I couldn't use "intellectuals" for the whole century, since the term didn't come into common use until the mid-1920s, i.e., there were no *zhishifenzi* as such in the Qing). I provide a summary of that history, including a handy **chart**, in the appendix to these comments. I was focusing on making an accurate summary of the shape of the educated elites and their participation in public life, but what struck me was: the relationship between intellectuals and the land.

The historical survey of intellectuals and the institutions they served highlights that the relationship between China's educated elite and local society has waxed and waned. In short: they were *shi* 士 and *shenfu* 绅夫 or *shidaifu* 士大夫 in the Qing, studying for and serving the Confucian state, but certified by state exams as the local elite, the *literati*, who helped administer local affairs, mostly as local landlords. During the revolutionary upheavals, that job was lost and many moved to the treaty port cities to join the exciting modernizing sector as *zhishifenzi* 知识分子 or as various white collar professionals. This took them away from local society. Both the GMD and the CCP produced *cadres* 干部, and amongst them *zhishifenzi ganbu*, many of whom served as local magistrates, local military commanders, or otherwise took leading administrative positions in the countryside in the 1930s-40s. This continued into the PRC. Mao added to this various "to the village campaigns", culminating in the sentdown youth (*zhiqing* 知青) of the Cultural Revolution. That reconnected millions of intellectuals to the countryside, though often as the "stinking 9th category" (臭老九). The reform period has brought a mass exodus of those intellectuals from the countryside, beginning with the 1977-78 national university exams. We all know the current situation.

Here are the questions and challenges that come to me from this history:

1. The relationship between China's educated elite and local society can and does change—the history of changes means that today's relationship, or lack of it, does not have to be. It can change. This history gives us historical

confidence for change. But how to make change, and what change, and, by the way, *who* decides?

2. The relationship between *shi* 士 and *xiang* 乡 is a subset of *national politics* and political order and cannot be solved independently, or at least we have to take the broader political economy into consideration. So, the Qing order is not the same as the Maoist order—even though both were centralized systems that plugged intellectuals into the land—and those differences defined how the connections worked (from respected landlords and cultural brokers to state cadres to virtual prisoners). So, the history reminds us to identify what is the political economy today that defines the context for the relationship between intellectual and the land? For example, most intellectuals today are *professionals*—something not existing in Qing times, and secondary in Maoist times. So, is our question today better cast as: how do we get professionals to engage post-rural society (per Chen Guangzhong’s paper) in the world of WTO regulations?
3. The way we talk about “the land” is a subset of our cultural assumptions and national myths (“national myths” are the ones you and I believe!). This reminds us of the reality of “representations.” For Wang Shiwei rural China was the image of backwardness, superstition, and the shameful cause of China’s weakness in the international scene. For Deng Tuo, “the people” of rural Hebei and Shanxi were worthy humans subject to oppression and deprived of cultural training by evil-doers; they deserved “liberation” (i.e., his leadership to a new, fair, and cultured form of China that he would show them). We all know of other representations, from the “root seeking” (寻根) literature of the 1980s to both idealization and anti-idealizations of local society in Chinese literature today. This history reminds us to ask: what do we mean by “the land”? Do we mean it sociologically (rural society), culturally (as somehow better or worse, but in any case different from the urban culture

we all live in)? Americans believed in the “democracy of the family farm” as part of their national identity long after there were hardly any such farms.

What does “the land” (乡村, 农村, 乡土中国!) represent in China today? To you? To me?

4. So, change can be pursued on two tracks: *social* (what we do) and *cultural* (what we think about it and tell ourselves). Though what we do and how we understand what it is we do are obviously related, the distinction seems useful to me. It is useful because it makes us double-check our assumptions.

So, you can see, I really am an academic! I worry myself with definitions and cautions and caveats until it is hard to see what to do. That’s why I’m glad several of you are here with actual experience under your belts. I don’t mean to dismiss academic inquiry, rather to put it in its proper place: as an important voice at the table of policy deliberation. The warnings and questions I raise (and which others have raised) can help us avoid blind paths and help us plan useful solutions (and it will also shape my future research).

I look forward to our conversations.

Appendix: Social Roles of China's Educated Elite in the 20th Century

Intellectuals and academics have not always been related in China, as they are today, for the simple reason that they are both social constructions of the past century; they did not exist a century ago. However, we can trace the relationship between China's *educated elite* and *public institutions of knowledge* over the twentieth century.¹ Under the scholar-official system of the Qing dynasty, China's educated elite were on the one hand *officials* (*guan*) of the state when so-employed and on the other hand were *local elite* (*shen* or *shidafu*) who dominated the cultural organization and the disposition of wealth in local communities across China. Under the Qing (and several earlier dynasties), China's educated elite did not just advise the government—they *were* the government. Similarly, at the local level these literati families came from and then replaced landed aristocracy, becoming by the second millennium (1000 CE onward) landed elite certified by the examination system (the old English term has been applied to this elite, *gentry*, but has come into disfavor among international scholars recently).

The social role of China's educated elite since the ending of the Confucian state exams (in 1905), the fall of the dynastic system, and the forced integration of Chinese economic and social life with the new world order of the European Westphalian nation state system, has been as upset as the society it serves. In the unsteady years between the end of the Qing administration in 1911 and the relative securing of the GMD administration in 1927, an unstable mix of roles appeared in intellectual life in Chinese society—scholar-official, intellectual cadre, social critic, academic specialist and even writer and entertainer. Throughout this period, however, one thing was consistent: the alienation of the educated elite from local society. This was part and parcel of the Western-style commercial and capitalist urbanization of the treaty ports

¹ To understand the changes in the relationship between China's educated elite and its institutions of knowledge we need to analyze three things: the *institutions* that have organized certified knowledge and licensed practitioners in China, the *identity* of the educated elite, including their sense of self, their group *elan*, and their professed public mission, and finally, the *social role*, what these educated folk have in fact done in Chinese society through their various institutions.

(an urbanization distinctly different from commercial cities and metropoli in China before 1800).

The next solid social role for China's educated elite was as *cadres* (*ganbu*), first under the GMD and concurrently the then-illegal CCP, and from 1950 under the state administration of the CCP's PRC. The cadre included a range of functionally differentiated sub-roles: party cadres, military cadres, mass organization cadres, and intellectual cadres. Intellectual cadres, or *zhishifenzi ganbu*, became the defining inhabitants of the state-run universities and research institutes of the PRC (not to mention the newspapers and periodicals, radio, and later TV directed by the propaganda department). They bring to mind the professional academics of modern Western universities. They, however, were not and are not academics. The role of intellectual cadre is broader than academic—it includes writers, artists, moviemakers, and, importantly, elementary and middle school teachers, that is pre-tertiary teachers. Also, this identity, even for university specialists in recognizable disciplines, includes assumptions and duties beyond what we consider academic professions in the German model. The intellectual cadre had a commitment to an *a priori* intellectual discourse (such as Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought) and an organizational subservience to a political party and its political platform, the General Line (and later modifications of it) of the CCP that promoted class warfare and social revolution, and later reform and now the “harmonious society” (policy of the current CCP leadership). Such social engagement and political subservience do not characterize the identity of modern professionals.

Thus, the role of an intellectual cadre in, say a Chinese Academy of Science (whether in Nanjing under the GMD or in Beijing under the CCP today), is to provide knowledge that is of service to the action plan of the Party-State. Therefore, proper training in say, chemistry, is not to be dismissed; in fact, it is required, but the social role of the chemist in the CAS is not to be a member of the international profession of academic and research chemists, or that is only secondary, rather it is to put advanced

knowledge of chemistry to work to solve current problems in the state plan. Since humanities and social sciences are less clearly relevant to the economic plan, they were coordinated in the PRC by the “Propaganda and Education system” (*xuanjiao xitong*) in which the various state, party, military, and mass organization efforts to generate and use humanities and social science knowledge to mobilize compliance with the current state plan were directed by a specific member of the CCP Politburo.

As such, the role of intellectual cadres as socializers and as motivators in the service of this or that Five Year Plan dominated their social roles under the PRC. They were, as Mao famously demanded in his “Yan’an Talks on Art and Literature” in 1942, propagandists, veritable military line officers on the “cultural front”. Indeed, even with the very real delegitimation of the cadre role in the post-Mao period stemming from these abuses, the expectation that China’s educated elite will *somehow* participate actively in the administration of society remains in the minds of all actors—from government officials, to the general public, to (and especially among) *xuezhe* (“those who study”) themselves.

The financial realities of the reform period since 1978 have changed the cadre role. The government that is still dominated by the CCP, admittedly a CCP torn by self-doubt, cannot fund universities fully any longer. Thus, not only is the state-centered role of the intellectual cadre suspect from its abuses under Mao, but also it is not financially sustainable. Other sources of support must be located and encouraged to give money to fund intellectual work. This requires that China’s institutions and educated elite—its universities and academics—provide something of use for their new benefactors—businesses and children of entrepreneurs.

That something is professional expertise. The emerging social role of Chinese intellectual elite in the 1990s is that of *specialist* (*zhuanjia*). Specialists are the fruition of the professionalization process. Professions are defined by their specialty: historians are not political scientists and anthropologists are not sociologists. Thus, in

the contemporary period we increasingly see scholars employed as academics in universities participating in the ordering of society as specialists who advise government and business. Their certification is no longer purely state exams or cadre status in the party-state, but rather university position and professional certification first by a Ph.D. in the requisite field (and remember: Chinese universities and research institutes rarely used PhD's before 1978) and then re-certification through active publishing in recognized academic journals. All the while, the problem of their relationship to local society remains: like the cadres, these scholars/academics are no longer local elite as were the literati; unlike former cadres, they have no direct responsibilities to administer local society. Many contemporary scholars/academics address the profound troubles of local society, but they do so as outsiders bringing professional expertise to bear on these problems, not as *in situ* community members or leaders.

CHART

Intellectual Institutions, Roles, and Identities in the 20th Century

二十世纪知识分子的制度, 角色, 及自我认同 (身分)

<i>Period</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Social Role</i>
Qing 清朝	<i>Keju</i> 科举 Examination system	<i>Wenren</i> 文人 Literatus	<i>Shen/guan</i> 绅—官 Gentry, scholar-official
Republic 民国	<i>Daxue</i> 大学 Universities: Private = professional	<i>Zhishifenzi</i> 知识分子 or intelligentsia; <i>Zhuanjia</i> Professional <i>Zuojia</i> writer	Mixed: 杂 --official --social critic --cadre/ <i>ganbu</i> --specialist --entertainer
Mao Period 毛时代	<i>Daxue</i> 大 学 Universities: state-run = government 宣教系统	<i>Zhishifenzi</i> <i>ganbu</i> <i>知识分子干</i> <i>部, 党员</i> Intellectual cadre	Cadre 干部 Propagandist 宣传家 Theorist 理论家
Reform 改革时代	<i>Daxue</i> 大 学 Universities: mixed = professional 教育部	<i>Xuezhe</i> 学者 Scholar, academic	<i>Zhuanjia</i> 专家 Specialist <i>Zuojia</i> writer <i>Pinglunjia</i> Social critic <i>Meiti xing</i> 媒体星 <i>Media star</i>